Self Deception: Six Steps to CURFEW Bad Information for Analytics and AI
Six Steps to CURFEW Bad Information for Analytics and AI
There is a dilemma faced by anyone who crunches numbers, develops AI, or supports “fact-based” analytics. The narrative is more powerful than our elegant math.
Apparently, humans are hard-wired to prefer simple, deterministic ideas and gladly accept simple, crisp concepts. We prefer them over complex truths. We persist in our preferences even when faced with evidence to the contrary, and we rarely seek evidence to change our views.
This is not news. Daniel Kahneman wrote about it in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow. He includes observations of his own odd biases, pointing out that knowledge does little to extinguish them.
This unpleasant reality intruded again in a recent story, Blind Spots in the ‘Blind Audition’ Study. You might have heard of the blind audition study, which found women were more likely to be offered positions in orchestras when auditions screened performers from judges. For anyone concerned about fairness, it was appealing. The study offered an uncomplicated way to judge performers on merit alone.
It was widely cited. Malcolm Gladwell made it popular, but many of us piled on. However, most of us didn’t carefully read the study or read summaries by others who didn’t really read it either.
Now the tables have turned and show that data and the study don’t really support blind auditions helping women. This is NOT a simple topic; there are many factors like changing demographics, a decline in gender bias, and others.
It was so simple and neat, so appealing.
The real caution here is not gender bias, orchestras, or blind auditions. The lesson is the power of narrative. A simple appealing narrative will win out over truth. Once the truth has been hidden by the simple wrong idea, wrong ideas can linger for a long time.
A sobering example is the study of causes that lead to the stock market crash of 1929. The crash started over a several-day period. There was a narrative, “now is the time to buy.” But the decline persisted into 1932, and it took more than 20 years before valuations returned. The causes of the crash are widely agreed on but wrong according to thoughtful analysis.
The analysis doesn’t kill bad narratives – only alternative narratives do. For the crash of Black Monday, no narrative has yet emerged to debunk the myths, which are still “studied” in economics.
We’d like to think otherwise. We want to believe “in data we trust.” We want to agree with Richard Feynman when he said, “It doesn’t matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn’t matter how smart you are. If it doesn’t agree with the experiment, it’s wrong.” While Feynman was right about facts and experiments proving us wrong, Kahneman is also right. We are superb at ignoring facts.
This has serious implications for AI. If we rely on humans to label data and provide arbitrate that is “correct,” we must expect bias and errors. And we must expect consensus error in many cases where a powerful false narrative is in force.
What can we do? Here are six questions we can ask to test whether we should be more skeptical about a subject. The mnemonic spells CURFEW. We can’t stop bad narratives from emerging, and we should not even want to in a free society. But these six questions can help us, both as individuals and as developers of analytics and AI.
Asking these six questions can help us avoid errors and build narratives to replace the ones we use to deceive ourselves and the self-delusion of clients.
Conflicts of Interest – Does the “expert” who owns a narrative gain from it? Some advice is unbiased, but much is not. Advisors and subject matter experts often don’t understand their own biases. When they have reason to want to believe a narrative, it’s cognitively comfortable. We need to hear from someone who does not agree. If the expert with the second (or third) opinion has a conflict, too, at least we are hearing another narrative.
Uncertainty – is there more than one answer? – People love stories about coins with two heads. We like the idea that we know how risk will play out. But we don’t.
The world is filled with uncertainty. Some of it offers possible rewards, and some uncertainty we call “risk.” But our brains and AI are poor at accommodating it. As we’ve pointed out before, some birds are better at uncertainty than we are.
AI is bad at this for two reasons. First, the most common forms don’t handle probability very well. Second, the humans who trained the AI may be biased.
We need to ask about all the possibilities and understand the odds or statistics; we need to understand the entire span of uncertainty. This is one reason why all and any software platforms Lone Star uses preserve uncertainty. With modern computing power, there is rarely a reason to do otherwise.
Reliance on Authority – does someone “important” say so? We tend to believe silly things experts say. Harry Markowitz won a Nobel prize in economics because one Sunday afternoon, it dawned on him that the prevailing wisdom on portfolio valuation could not possibly be right. An expert-authored a book decades before; no one before Harry bothered to check.
We do need to “stand on the shoulders of giants,” as Newton said. And we can’t check everything. But we can ask, what is the track record of this expert?
Today the authority is not a person; it is data. When “authority” is a data set or data science, Judea Pearl, one of the great living experts on mathematics- suggests the TPT test:
- Transparency – are the analytics or the model processing the data understandable? It doesn’t have to be simple, but can we test it? Audit it? Do we understand what’s going on inside?
- Power – is predictive power useful? The most commonly accurate weather prediction is that tomorrow will be like today. This transparent model has predictive ” accuracy, ” but it’s not usefully predictive. There is no useful power.
- Testability – can we test to see if the assumptions in the model or analytics are consistent with the data and anything else we hold to be correct?
Familiar Risks – do the risks seem to be known? We have a risk narrative that’s nothing more than tribal lore in many settings. Some members of our company, family, or profession faced a risk that went wrong, and our tribe decided we needed to keep an eye on this. There are nearly two important errors in how we deal with these familiar risks. First, they blind us to other risks, which are often much worse. This is a placebo effect. We feed well because we are doing risk management. A second important error is our failure to understand our options for mitigation.
To break free from the forces of familiar risk, we need to look at what others think. What risks do other tribes deal with, and how do they deal with them? Risks can be mitigated in two ways. We can try to either prevent the dreadful things from happening, or we can try to moderate the impact if they do. Getting out our own tribal lore helps with naming risks we might not have considered, finding means to avoid them, and moderating their impact. But the narrative of familiar risks can’t do any of that.
Ease of Understanding – is the answer easy to grasp? A commonly taught market theory is that the 1929 crash was caused (in part) due to margin loans. People were able to borrow to buy stock, and the money was too easy. This is an appealing and simple narrative, but the facts are a little different. Margin lending had become regulated, and lending was less available. The truth may be that margin loans were bad, but regulating them too quickly and aggressively made things worse. Or, maybe the counter-narrative is just a simple story that’s also flawed.
The point is that we need to be wary of any simple explanation. And, the more complex the topic, the less likely a simple narrative is helpful. Occam’s razor seems to teach otherwise. But the simplest explanation of a complex topic may not be simple. William of Occam probably said something like, “Entities should not be multiplied without necessity.” Sometimes it is necessary.
Work – is it hard work to grasp other explanations? – Sadly, there are many important things that require effort before we can grasp them.
Quantum mechanics can make your head hurt, but no one really understands quantum mechanics. That’s, in part, an old joke, and both the joke and quantum mechanics are still true.
The easy narrative helps our lazy brains avoid work, as Kahneman explains. And, if we want to help promote truth and accuracy, we’ll need to generate alternative narratives. That’s work worth doing.